Neighborhood-Driven Policing:
A Series of Working Papers from the Futures Working Group

Editors:
Carl J. Jensen III and Bernard H. Levin
January, 2005
Acknowledgments

The editors wish to thank the following individuals for their significant contributions to this project: FBI Behavioral Science Unit Interns Jeffrey Scott, Heather Hutchens, and Angela Parson; FBI Graphic Artist Diane E. Hall; K. L. Morrison who provided the photo on front cover; and Michael Buerger who provided valuable editorial advice.
# Table of Contents

A Word from the Chairman  
Carl J. Jensen III .................................................................................................................. 1

Preface to "A Proposal for an Enlarged Range of Policing: Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP)"  
Richard W. Myers ................................................................................................................. 3

A Proposal for an Enlarged Range of Policing: Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP)  
Bernard H. Levin and Richard W. Myers .................................................................................. 4

Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP): Some Thoughts  
Carl J. Jensen III .................................................................................................................. 10

Windmills as Ogres, Communities as Chimeras: Several Thoughts on Neighborhood-Driven Policing  
Michael Buerger .................................................................................................................... 13

Comments on Levin's and Myers' Article  
"A Proposal for an Enlarged Range of Policing: Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP)"  
Lou Mayo .................................................................................................................................. 18

Network Centric Policing: Alternative or Augmentation to the Neighborhood-Driven Policing Model?  
Thomas J. Cowper .................................................................................................................. 21

Response to: "A Proposal for an Enlarged Range of Policing: Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP)"  
Gene Stephens .......................................................................................................................... 29

Historical Perspectives: The Evolution of Community Policing from its Origins in the United Kingdom  
Alan Beckley ................................................................................................................................ 35

Future Perspectives: Going Local: A History of the Future of the Police  
Lucy Harrad .............................................................................................................................. 39
A Word from the Chairman

In February, 2002, a group of police managers and futurists representing the FBI and the Society of Police Futurists International (PFI) (www.policefuturists.org) assembled at the FBI Academy in Quantico. Their goal: to form an organization that would develop forecasts and strategies to ethically maximize the effectiveness of local, state, federal, and international law enforcement bodies in the 21st century. Two months later, FBI Director Robert Mueller and PFI President Gerald Konkler signed a Memorandum of Understanding creating the Futures Working Group (FWG). Since its inception, the FWG has assembled a body of work relating to the future and policing. The bulk of the articles in the present volume were initiated at a FWG meeting hosted by the Institute for Law Enforcement Administration in Plano, Texas, in the spring of 2003. I thank this institution for its wonderful hospitality!

The purpose of futures research is to intrigue, goad, and challenge. Ultimately, those who fancy themselves futurists hope to make people think. As you consider the thoughts presented in this series of working papers, you may find yourself agreeing, disagreeing or becoming just plain agitated. All of that is to be expected. Ultimately, it is our fervent desire that this slim volume will motivate you to devise ways to create your own preferred futures—for yourself, for your agency, and for the communities you serve.

Carl J. Jensen III, Ph.D.
Supervisory Special Agent
Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Academy
Chairman, Futures Working Group
Quantico, Virginia
October, 2004

The opinions and statements contained in this volume are those of the individual authors and should not be considered an endorsement by the FBI or the Department of Justice for any policy, program, or service.
Preface to "A Proposal for an Enlarged Range of Policing: Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP)"

Richard W. Myers

When I was asked to join my good friend and colleague, Professor Bud Levin, in drafting a provocative paper on extending the continuum of policing philosophies, I knew it was going to stimulate feedback. As a police chief, I know all about the paradox police face. They work in a dynamic environment that changes daily, yet police are extremely resistant to organizational change. I knew that my minor contribution would not interfere with Dr. Levin's "take no prisoners" approach! I also knew that we had quickly and succinctly cracked a few doors without fully entering the room to see what lay beyond. Mostly, I knew the fountain of wisdom and experience that is represented by the membership of the Society of Police Futurists International and the Futures Working Group would tear into our draft with vigor.

I am pleased that the papers that followed our initial work have not only identified the many untouched concerns and details needed to put meat on the bones, but have proffered alternatives and expansions to the simple theme of neighborhood ownership of police activities. Even the harshest critique of the original concept offers up guidance for those who would like to advance policing. Indeed, I must admit to little optimism that the concept we described could be fully implemented in the present day. The response papers have, however, renewed my sense that it is time for significant reform in policing.

NDP begins to take shape when assimilating ideas from the response papers, e.g., network centric policing, having an officer "own" a few hundred homes and integrating the broader components of restorative justice. NDP begins to fade away when reflecting on the significant hurdles of political reality, resistance to change outside and within police agencies, and policing's historical evolution. But whether NDP progresses or fades into the oblivion that sometimes accompanies academic crayon drawings, I hope it will serve as a stimulus for continued dialogue on the future direction of policing.

Rather than view our paper as road kill waiting for the vultures to pick at it, I envision it as the appetizer one nibbles on while preparing for the main course. I can't wait to see what's for dessert.
A Proposal for an Enlarged Range of Policing: Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP)

Bernard H. Levin and Richard W. Myers

The purpose of this article is to stimulate dialogue about potential evolutions of the current models of policing. Before we proceed to lay out the model, two caveats are in order. First, the discussion of NDP is intended to be descriptive rather than prescriptive. It is our goal only to expand the existing range of choices rather than to recommend any particular choice. Such decisions, in our view, belong properly to the affected neighborhood. Each neighborhood gets, or should get, the opportunity to make its own choices and to live with the consequences of those choices. Second, these models are points on a continuum. We do not see, nor do we foresee, any pure cases in what passes for real life. As with most models, reality will dictate when theory yields to practice.

Robert Peel's oft-repeated maxim, "that the police are the public and that the public are the police" (Peel, 1822) has yet to be fully embraced by mainstream policing. Most policing activity, in the U.S. and elsewhere, remains centered on official discretion, official action, and official assessment/evaluation. The neighborhood is the primary locus of action and sometimes a source of information. In spite of the most recent philosophies espoused by police leaders, the neighborhood drives policing activity only rarely, and then not systematically.

At present there are two primary competing models of policing. One, variously entitled "combat policing" (Levin, Myers, and Broadfoot, 1996) or "traditional law enforcement," focuses on suppression of crime. Its primary virtues are apparent clarity and simplicity of mission and susceptibility to mensuration. In combat policing there is no formal provision for input from the neighborhood, although it is clearly recognized that some input, often indirect, does occur. The other current genre, variously entitled "community policing" or "community-oriented policing" (often combined with a problem-solving or problem-oriented component) allows for a modicum of neighborhood input (e.g., Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990; Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, 1990; Alpert and Piquero, 2000; Goldstein, 1990; Police Foundation, 2003 and, to a lesser extent, Hartmann, Brown, and Stephens, 1989; but see Zhao, He, and Lovrich, 2003; and Schafer, Huebner, and Bynum, 2003), but it is still the police who are the decision-makers and the actors. It is the purpose of this paper to propose a third model, one in which the neighborhood is both the primary decision-maker and often a major player in enacting decisions. In effect, we propose extending the currently truncated continuum.

Law enforcement has a well-earned reputation for resisting change, especially when change threatens to control law enforcement behavior. Even corrections has long had neighborhood-driven models, variously known as restorative justice and reintegrative shaming. Those neighborhood-driven models are notable for their effectiveness in a field that has enjoyed few successes. In contrast, law enforcement traditionally has resisted rather than welcomed even community-level control (e.g., its response to proposals ranging from community review boards to involving citizens in the process of selecting police officers to widely deploying citizen volunteers in all aspects of policing). Neighborhood control is rarely considered, except in the very weak sense of neighborhood watch and its clones.
A Brief Description

For purposes of this discussion, "neighborhood" is defined as an interactive group. While most will, for the foreseen future, be physical and geostatic, virtual neighborhoods of various sorts do exist and will become far more frequent in the future. For geostatic groups, the scope will range from city blocks through neighborhoods and unincorporated rural areas to local political subdivisions.

The neighborhood-driven model assumes the local election/selection of a board. Ideally, members of the board would be representative opinion leaders. The board’s role would include oversight over the tasking of officers, including outcomes assessment and resource allocation. The characteristics of the board, as well as the other aspects of this model, will depend on neighborhood-level decisions. There would be no two alike.

At first blush, the differences between COP and NDP may seem trivial; they are not. COP is a top-down construct or at most a "middle down" construct; if officers are truly empowered, they are making a lot of decisions, but the point is, it's still not the neighborhood driving the bus. Members of the community may be partners in COP, but they are junior partners at best. They supply information to the police, who serve as the primary decision-makers and who wield the bulk of the power. NDP presumes precisely the opposite: neighborhood members are the senior partners; they make many of the decisions that historically have been made by the police.

As in restorative justice, NDP presumes that the neighborhood will also serve as a resource. While some in policing may be reluctant to admit it, some of the best solutions for crime and disorder have nothing to do with the police (see Sherman, Gottfredson, MacKenzie, Eck, Reuter, and Bushway, 1998). Neighborhood boards would be expected to develop novel solutions to some policing problems by taking advantage of extra-legal neighborhood resources.

In the NDP model, the police function as servants of the people. They serve as consultants, supplying information about "what works" in the prevention and solution of crime. They may also be tasked to solve particular problems. And as necessary, they carry out traditional duties of patrol, investigation and arrest. Table 1 provides a brief overview of some relationships between neighborhood-driven policing and the present models.

Why NDP Now

Current models of policing are artifacts of the industrial age. With their large hierarchical structures and emphasis on linearity and upon strength in numbers, they were designed to emulate a military model that no longer exists (see Krulak, 1999).

NDP is an attempt to develop the first policing model for the information age; it was formulated with an appreciation for and an emphasis on the world as it currently exists. It also recognizes the reality that if policing is unable to adjust to this rapidly changing world of ours, it risks obsolescence.

The 21st Century and NDP

Garreau (1999) notes that one of the most profound realities of the information age is the manner in which information technology has shifted the power from hierarchies to social networks. People routinely communicate and access information at near instantaneous speed. Institutions that once enjoyed insularity are finding their worlds increasingly transparent.
NDP recognizes this reality and attempts to capitalize on it. Rather than viewing the neighborhood as either the target (combat policing) or a source of information and problem identification (COP), NDP places the emphasis where it always should have been, with the neighborhood leading itself and deciding its own fate. NDP integrates the principles of the new style of electronic communications and the virtual neighborhood to expedite vital information sharing between and among the public and the police.

In the NDP model, police officers will be closely linked to their respective neighborhoods through the use of modern communication networks including wireless email, voice over IP, and integrated communicators, inter alia. Web-based, interactive information sharing within and between neighborhoods will create enhancements to existing neighborhood watch networks. Neighborhood residents, feeling more "in the know" real-time, will in turn increase real-time delivery of information and intelligence to the police. The stronger communication links may increase the sense of ownership, thus enhancing participation by volunteers.

Benefits for the Police

NDP has potential for increasing rather than decreasing the role and power of the police. Rather than functioning purely as a combat leader, the police chief becomes a true coalition builder and professional developer. In essence, NDP offers the promise of shared governance.

The NDP front-line officer also assumes many roles: counselor, leader, consultant, facilitator, and problem-solver. When necessary, the officer carries out the traditional duties of investigation and arrest. Some current COP/POP officers perform these roles. However, in other ways the NDP officer is quite different.

Under the NDP model, hiring and training practices will have to undergo a radical transformation. Officers will be selected for their intelligence and leadership potential rather than their brawn and ability to unhesitatingly follow orders. While COP/POP officers may be selected for these cerebral traits, in NDP there is even greater emphasis on them. In addition, the public will be much more involved in selecting NDP officers. The NDP role will require enhanced levels of entry-level education (at the bachelor's and master's levels as a minimum) and will entail training far beyond what is currently offered. In order to attract the caliber of personnel required to carry out NDP, entry-level salaries may need to increase commensurately.

In spite of these enhanced requirements, NDP actually offers potential cost savings. Because the neighborhood will be a resource rather than merely a customer, fewer officers may be needed. Will some officers with traditional skills be needed? Surely. The need to make physical arrests will not disappear. However, power in the information age will reside primarily in intelligence, speed, and flexibility, not in mass and authority. Enhanced educational requirements, better training, and increased salaries also offer the potential for something policing has aspired to but never attained: the status of a profession.

Homeland security is a buzz-phrase that implies a wide range of fears, needs, and shortfalls in our current social superstructure. NDP opens opportunities to manage homeland security, not only at the lowest effective level, but at the only effective level. It allows the neighborhood to determine its own level of risk, remediation, and security, thereby allowing for enhanced control and empowerment. Despite the best intentions of federal and state governments, homeland security is primarily a neighborhood issue. This is true whether we are talking about information collection or whether we are talking about taking action.
Implications and Path Forward

NDP is most likely to be tried in neighborhoods that have adopted the COP/POP philosophy. These local neighborhoods will find it easier to make the transition to NDP because they already will be accustomed to increased interaction with their police and, similarly, the police officers already will be accustomed to more proactive and positive contacts with the public. The public will benefit from more awareness of current police procedures and gain greater insight into the "police culture" before applying greater control over the police.

Training and education targeted at the job should begin early in the college careers of potential police candidates. Additionally, candidates from non-traditional sources should be heavily recruited. Such sources should include public school faculties and social services department staff.

Selection of the controlling board may pose challenges. Some mechanism may be needed to screen out of the controlling board those who would join for the same ill-advised reasons that we now use to screen out poor candidates for police positions (power/authority seeking, poor skills, narrow or limited political agenda, etc.). It is crucial that partisanship be eschewed in favor of a broad sense of neighborhood ownership: board members must be able to leave their hats at the door.

Even in the current COP/POP model, police officers have a bias toward the routine, resisting change whenever possible and unless the change meets a "what's in it for me" standard, such as enhancing their job tasks. The path toward NDP will require officers who are much more flexible than many now employed.

Summary and Conclusion

Neighborhood-Driven Policing extends the traditional continuum. It proposes a difference in degree rather than in kind. It reflects an opportunity to move emphasis from an early industrial age model to a model more compatible with the information age. Each neighborhood, however, must make its own choices and live with them.

Endnotes

1 The authors express their gratitude to members of the Futures Working Group (http://www.fbi.gov/hq/td/fwg/workhome.htm) and the Society of Police Futurists International (http://www.policefuturists.org) for their comments and suggestions.

2 Bernard H. Levin is Department Head/ Social Sciences, Blue Ridge Community College and Commander, Policy and Planning, Waynesboro Virginia Police Department

3 Richard W. Myers is Chief of Police, Appleton Wisconsin

Comments may be addressed to levinb@brcc.edu

References


## Appendix

### Table 1. Comparisons of Combat, COP/POP, and Neighborhood-Driven Policing models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Combat</th>
<th>COP/POP</th>
<th>Neighborhood-driven</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Future-orientation</td>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>Mostly reactive; some proactive</td>
<td>Mix of reactive and proactive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomenclature</td>
<td>Law enforcement officers</td>
<td>Police officers</td>
<td>Peace officers or social services officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of information-derived power</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Mostly officers; some community</td>
<td>Mostly neighborhood; some officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who processes data that are input to decisions?</td>
<td>Mix of officers and agency administration</td>
<td>Mostly officers; some administration</td>
<td>Mostly neighborhood; officers under neighborhood direction</td>
<td>Evidence-based policing, intelligence-driven policing, problem-solving orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who sets the agenda</td>
<td>Administration and officers</td>
<td>Officers, some administration, some community</td>
<td>Mostly neighborhood</td>
<td>Neighborhood delegates what it considers routine activities/decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who owns the values and goals?</td>
<td>Jurisdictional authorities and administration with little community input</td>
<td>Some community input</td>
<td>Mostly neighborhood except for routine/default/extreme events</td>
<td>Implies respect for diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who are the primary actors, once decisions are made?</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions (among many)</td>
<td>Officers have power and expertise</td>
<td>Officers have power and expertise</td>
<td>Neighborhood members have power and expertise, with officers as supplemental</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key areas of expertise</td>
<td>Mechanics of arrest, knowledge of law, investigative skills</td>
<td>Problem solving tactics and social skills</td>
<td>Social skills and insider knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP): Some Thoughts

Carl J. Jensen III

My few remarks will confine themselves to the degree to which NDP comports to my vision(s) of the future.

Networking

Building on Garreau (1999), NDP may offer the potential for physical and virtual networking on a scale not currently seen in policing. One could reasonably conclude that Levin and Meyers feel that neighborhoods possess their own "personalities." Depending upon one's definition, a neighborhood will likely possess greater homogeneity (socially, culturally, ethnically) than a "jurisdiction" or even a "community." Neighborhoods in one jurisdiction may or may not reflect the character of other locations within that same jurisdiction. Put another way, it is quite likely that there are neighborhoods in New York that have more in common with similar neighborhoods in Chicago than they do with others in New York. Would it not make sense for such entities to form problem-solving consortiums to deal with like issues, the solution to which may more easily generalize from neighborhood to neighborhood rather than from agency to agency? Information age technologies make such virtual networking not only possible, but well within the financial and technical reach of even small departments. Should NDP evolve in this manner, it will likely be the first significant step toward virtual community policing.

Problem Solving

The rate of technological change is accelerating (Kurzweil, 1999). At least one futurist predicts that by the year 2020, the amount of information in the world will double every 73 days (Schwartz, 1999). In such an evolving world, where drastic change is the norm, how long will we in policing continue to delude ourselves into thinking that we, and only we, possess all the solutions to maintaining peace and stability in our communities? NDP is radical in this sense: it forces the police to adopt community members as peers in solving problems. And like it or not, some rather novel and even good solutions may emerge from folks who are not blinded by parochialism. Consider one field experiencing exponential change: in the artificial intelligence world, teams comprised of engineers, programmers, psychologists, linguists, and others work side-by-side. In the marketplace of ideas, diversity is thought to be a strength, not a liability. Of course, novel and diverse solutions can also lead to truly bad outcomes; what looks good on paper may not translate well into practice. Therefore, it will be incumbent on the NDP chief of police/sheriff to be well-informed, persuasive, and, to borrow a phrase from a former co-worker, a true "coalition builder" (Monroe, 1998) to guide his/her community through the minefield of seemingly good but impractical, illegal, or just plain dumb ideas.

Will the Future Really Be All that Different from the Past?

Smart (2003) opines that technological change continues to accelerate while social change has stagnated. To that end, should we reasonably expect public acceptance of and support for NDP to be much different than current police-
community initiatives? If so, current research does not bode well for NDP success, especially where it would be expected to do the most good. For example, consistent evidence from such community-based programs as neighborhood watch suggest an inverse relationship between levels of crime and community involvement to address that crime (Skogan, 1990).

As well, community involvement in most social endeavors generally has declined in recent years (Putnam, 2000). A fair question to ask, then, is this: do we have any reason to believe that community members will have the time and interest to invest in NDP in the future? Not likely, at least if we expect individuals to attend regularly scheduled meetings at the local police substation. One possible solution would be to conduct NDP business virtually. Galston (undated) notes that virtual groups are increasingly replacing physical ones; with their low entry and exit requirements, emphasis on mutual interest and convenience, they offer an attractive alternative to face-to-face meetings. However, these same attributes may also lay the foundation for group irrelevance: easy ingress and egress may encourage abandonment rather than discourse; as well, it may not foster mutual obligation and sacrifice, two cornerstones of any generally accepted concept of "community" (Putnam, 2000).

And yet, NDP may offer the next logical step in policing as well as the proper milieu in which to meld the virtual with the physical: while offering the convenience of electronic discussions, the membership is still organized around the physical neighborhood, an interest that extends beyond the virtual. In addition, the neighborhood provides a much more understandable and directly relevant physical boundary than does "community," "jurisdiction" or "agency."

The Next Step

Levin and Myers claim that their model is "descriptive rather than prescriptive" (Levin & Myers, 2004). They nevertheless quite convincingly argue for a concept that may well yield the next breakthrough in community-driven governance.

The authors, or those inspired by their vision, should give serious consideration to formalizing and testing their model in the "real world." There are undoubtedly many jurisdictions that possess neighborhoods appropriate for this purpose (whether there are a plethora of police chiefs willing to allow such a test in their jurisdiction is open to debate). In any case, the next steps to NDP appear to be: a) develop the model to the point that it can be tested; b) secure funding to carry out research; and c) locate an appropriate test bed. Levin and Myers are to be saluted for their insight and future(s) orientation: now it's time to get to work.

Endnotes

1Supervisory Special Agent Jensen is assigned to the Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Academy. He is the chairman of the Futures Working Group.

References


Windmills as Ogres, Communities as Chimeras: Several Thoughts on Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP)

Michael Buerger

"And the end of all our exploring/Will be to arrive where we started/And know the place for the first time."

T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets,

Little Giddings

This is a story of competing nostalgias, each yearning for something that never was, and perhaps can never be.

Professional policing was in the first instance an ideal, something proposed to replace the very thing we now propose to replace it with: neighborhood-driven policing. The police literature calls that earlier version of NDP "political" policing, but at least superficially, it shared many aspects with the notion of community policing. Among those aspects were decision-making by local elites, who are organized into a formal structure with informal connections; informal influence over the police who patrol the particular area; police responsiveness that is relatively independent of hierarchical orders, as befits "servants of the people."

Against this backdrop, the claim that NDP represents "the promise of shared governance" will need to be tested and verified continuously. The negatives that attended the political era of policing included a raft of pathologies that we hope were particular to the early industrial age. The institutions of representative government had been captured by machine politics and the spoils system, both based upon principles of exclusion. In turn, exclusion required group identity and power blocs at the local level. Such blocs were formed, ipso facto, by natural grouping related to immigration patterns. Whoever could "deliver" the bloc vote of a particular group received power from the winning political machine. The ability to receive services under that system did not rest upon any fair claim of citizenship or residency: it hinged on the degree to which one courted, paid, and obeyed the local ward heeler. Touted as a democracy, American cities functioned formally with a republican government that was only nominally democratic: where the soles hit the bricks, neighborhoods were medieval fiefdoms. The fundamental improvements of capitalism meant that the serfs were no longer tied to the land, but neither did they enjoy the slender benefits of noblesse oblige.

Anthropomorphism has long been a marvelous tool of informal education, illustrating complex stories and concepts by abstracting them into accessible human terms. Its value in policy terms may be more dubious. Levin and Myers present "the neighborhood" in fundamentally anthropomorphic terms: "the neighborhood leading itself and deciding its own fate." The history of small-scale democracy holds a number of warnings against unrealistic expectations in this regard:

- Not all neighborhoods are created equal; the critical element of neighborhood empowerment varies tremendously, from inner-city ghettos poor in human capital to elite gated communities that for the most part do control much of their own fate;
- Not all organizational efforts are sustainable, whether Saul Alinsky's or Officer Friendly's (Yates, 1973; Sadd and Grinc, 1993a, 1993b);
- Not all organizational efforts are benign, as witness the ongoing efforts against gangs in many urban
neighborhoods (and even Indian reservations);

- Not all allegiances are to the geospatial neighborhoods in which people find themselves, a fact that has been a continuing bane to community organizers in the inner-city neighborhoods that "Broken Windows" spurned as unsalvageable; people do not want to invest in such neighborhoods, they only want to get out of them;

- NDP competes historically with the challenges to fundamental expectations of citizenship, from Jim Crow to the California Walkman and Bensonhurst.

"The community" is neither a singular anthropomorphic entity nor a polymorphous network. While Levin and Myers prudently note that NDP constitutes a middle ground on a continuum of abstracts, we are still far short of a workable model for the concept. The most likely predictable outcome is that NDP follows the path of crime prevention and community policing; it will be strongest in the neighborhoods that need it least, and weakest in those that need it most.

The NDP concept asserts a small-scale democracy in the midst of a republican social and governmental context. In that regard, a neighborhood with NDP almost represents a 21st century utopian community. Assuming that the multiple local interests can move beyond the memory of segregated and "defended" neighborhoods (and the specter of vigilantism), the fact remains that local laws, ordinances, and expectations are subject to state and federal oversight. While in the authors' idea model the police would be arbiters in times of conflict, there will be times when neighborhood consensus will be in conflict with established law. The federal Constitution, and individual state constitutions, provide "floors" of rights that neighborhood sentiment and consensus cannot waive. The police will be caught in those situations: despite whatever moral authority the neighborhood bestows, the legal authority of the police derives from the state.

History provides some dubious döppelgangers for the NDP Board: local school boards, and civilian review boards of the police. A local board is a source of power: sources of power attract those who want power. The Jeffersonian ideal of an informed yeomanry as the engine of government has never materialized: it was strangled at birth by machine politics, the upscale, legitimized version of a gang. Local boards will be the focus of local power struggles over specific issues. In important ways, the rule of law--the overriding authority of the state and federal institutions--has evolved to serve as a leaven against the pendulum swings of political dominance. There is at least an outside possibility that the police will find themselves in opposition to the wishes of a board (and a community) that has the impression it can give them direction in areas beyond their actual governance.

There is also a tension between the locally-determined direction of the neighborhood-based police and the central functions of recruitment, hiring, training, promotion, and retention. The larger issues of recruitment and retention that have affected police agencies in the recent decades (particularly the core cities) will also play out at the neighborhood level. Either the strong neighborhood entities will skim the cream of the police department’s personnel (another parallel with the schools) or they will face the possibility that they must direct officers whose expectations of the police role is in conflict with neighborhood expectations. Issues of transition will need to be addressed to insure continuity of effort, as veteran officers move upward in the organization (or
outward to new opportunities in other agencies) and are replaced by those just beginning their careers and their learning curve. The legacy of successful community programs has been mixed in this regard: some manage the transition well, but many founder when the individual who was the driving force behind the success leaves.

Finally, there is the issue of "getting from Here to There." As we have seen across several generations of police reform, Peel's second principle--"The ability of the police to perform their task is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions, behavior, and on the ability of the police to secure and maintain public respect" (Peel, 1882 [1901; 1997:8])--is a complex dynamic, easily undermined by the flagrant actions of a few. Often, however, it has been the police themselves who have spurned the legitimate interests of the public in favor of the police subculture's mythological and self-perpetuating image of crime-fighting. Neighborhood-Driven Policing would certainly move the relationship in the right direction, if it can be properly implemented and sustained; we need to be skeptical about the ease with which the transition will be accomplished.

Peel's first Principle is more central to the debate than the abbreviated seventh Principle offered by Levin and Myers: "The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment." (Ibid.:8) It is this tension--between prevention and suppression--that most marks the line of demarcation between success and failure. This first Principle sets the groundwork for the next three, demanding public approval of the police mission, secured by the police themselves, by means inversely proportional to "the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives" (Ibid.:8). Peel's Principles were articulated as part of the debate to establish a civilian police force, before anyone knew exactly what a "police force" would be. Today's reform movements arise within the context of a police tradition nearly two centuries old. The common police-centered identification of the work as "law enforcement"--that is, suppression of crime through arrest-based deterrent--has long since swept aside the preventive role.

Though there are important exceptions (individuals who understand the need for a broader mission and a deeper set of tools), thief-taking remains the primary goal of police action as defined by most police officers. Persons present themselves for police employment with that goal and expectation (many swimming resolutely against the current of good advice given to them by academic advisors and even senior police officers) to "help people" by "catching bad guys." They are hired, trained, and socialized by officers of the preceding generation, who likewise presented themselves to the field with those expectations. Many successfully take on additional missions, but always as something extra; some never manage to break out of the enforcement-only mind-set.

Reforms such as Neighborhood-Driven Policing either have to be approved by the existing culture--cops as "the public," with the reformers playing the role of the "new police"--or have to bypass it completely and start from scratch. The very few experiments in the latter, such as Lauderhill, Florida (Scott, 1998), are neither well-documented nor strongly advocated within the field. The successful programs that have occurred have depended upon both champions and generous budgets. Though often used as templates for similar endeavors in other communities, they do not transplant well, and often do not survive changes of administrations. Those changes, in turn, can be deadly for subsequent attempts at reform and improvement, as the community side
undergoes a form of innovation fatigue. After seeing numerous police programs wrapped in wonderful promises arrive, swirl around, and die when the funding ran out, even the capable people (the natural allies of the police in the neighborhoods) become cynical about new police promises, withholding their commitment until something demonstrates to their satisfaction that it will not be just another woof 'n whinny show (Sadd and Grinc, 1993a, 1993b).

The "close links" to the neighborhood envisioned by NDP are still dependent less upon the technologies available and more upon the sustained, consistent investment by the community. It is that latter which may prove chimerical. This legacy of community policing and crime prevention endeavors is that the community has accepted the police role as "law enforcement expert," and does not expect to have to "be the police" in Peelian terms. Communities will come together to deal with crises, but with the expectation that they can go back to their customary lives once the crisis has been resolved (Yates, 1973).

There is an old joke about an indignant worshiper confronting his deity over the latter's failure to save him from a death by drowning, despite the worshiper's steadfast and strongly pronounced faith that the deity would save him. The deity replies: "I sent you the warning message on the radio; I sent you the neighbors in the car; I sent you the neighbors with the boat; I sent you the rescue team with the helicopter...." (A pithier win-the-lottery variant of the story concludes, "Nasrudin! At least buy a ticket!"). Neighborhood-Driven Policing runs the risk of being the deity, constantly (and fruitlessly) importuning its clients to take that one, simple little step for their own salvation.

Neighborhood-Driven Policing is an ideal, something already in place in some communities, and perhaps forever beyond the reach of some others, with vast middle ground. Before it can be implemented, both the police and the community will need to be roused from their comfortable expectations based upon the old policing models. Sharper definitions of community roles, actions, and responsibilities must be carved out before the community can step into its new relationship: many of the things it will be expected to do overlap, parallel, or encroach upon matters traditionally handled by organizational hierarchies. The old guard will fight the changes, and there will be predictable, unforeseen problems to be dealt with when good intentions miss the mark. In short, Neighborhood-Driven Policing represents a good idea--an advancement in police-community relations, and very possibly a better foundation from which to meet the challenges of the future--but it is one that requires considerable work and clear-headed evaluation (and revision) to make it a reality.

Endnotes

1 Dr. Buerger is Professor of Criminal Justice at Bowling Green State University.

References


National Institute of Justice.


Although Levin and Myers claim not to foresee any "pure cases," there is not a reason why the "pure cases" cannot be implemented in a suitable environment. This was the case for eight of the ten agencies in the multi-year demonstration program and in Laredo, Texas.

However, finding a suitable environment is difficult because, as Blumstein notes, police chiefs are unwilling to make the necessary organizational changes for true community policing (Epperson, 2000). It is true that neighborhoods should get the opportunity to make policing choices; yet, it is the responsibility of the police to educate, inform, and lead the community in identifying the alternative choices and implications of such choices.

All of Sir Robert Peel’s principles of policing are equally valid today, and American policing would be much improved if agencies adopted and implemented all of these concepts. Neighborhood residents are almost always the source of information both for the prevention and solution of police problems of crime and disorder. Such information is the lifeblood of policing and essential for its effectiveness. It is also relevant to the identification and resolution of most all quality of life issues, which the police should likewise address. Effectiveness is a function of the quality of interpersonal relationships established by the police with their respective residents. This is achieved when you hear an officer talking about "my people" and the people talking about "my police officer." In many, if not most, cases problems identified will need resources external to the neighborhood for resolution. The linkage between identified problems and needed resources for resolution should be a key police role.

In accordance with the views of Levin and Meyers, COMPSTAT per se is not a model of policing. Rather, COMPSTAT is simply a basic management information system to which one can insert any kind of organizational goals and measures. The big change for many agencies is that they have to formalize goals and measures, which are deficient or missing in many departments. Management accountability follows, which is also missing in many, if not most, departments.

Almost all police agencies that claim to be doing "community policing" are actually operating in the "traditional model," with so-called community policing as a minor add on. In actuality, there is little difference between true community policing (which is almost non-existent) and NDP. In true community policing, the heart of identifying and solving problems is the involvement of the individual with his or her personal police officer. The neighborhood is also involved through community meetings.

In true NDP/community policing, no time is wasted on random patrol. Research in both the U.S. and England established that random patrol has no significant effect on crime. Without wasting time on random patrol duties, the officers have time to spend interacting with the community through such things as household surveys. Thus the officers would get to know their people on a first name basis and vice versa. Homeland security would be greatly enhanced if each officer thoroughly knew the people and activities in his/her assigned area because terrorists would have no place to hide. This shift away from random patrols alone results in a reduction of over 50% in patrol car mileage/costs.
NDP/community policing results in significant cost savings. It would amount to a total savings of about 5% immediately, 10% in 3 to 5 years and possibly 20% in the 5 to 10 year time frame. These estimates do not include civil malpractice liability costs that should drop to almost zero, even including officer-at-fault vehicle accidents.

Law enforcement is a most inappropriate term for "policing." Actually, law enforcement only has a small role in enforcing laws, and generally, better policing has less law enforcement. At an FBI Futures International Conference held in 1991, two senior police officials from Australia asked, with puzzled expressions, why policing in America is called law enforcement when enforcing laws is such a small part of policing? The author would suggest that the term "law enforcement" be replaced with the term "police."

In most cases, the best solutions to crime, disorder, and quality of life problems do not involve use of police powers. The integration of the totality of all municipal and social service agencies with the people in the community are the solutions to most problems and issues. Statistically, less than 2% of police patrol time is spent on "crime" (UCR I) and most of this is taking routine reports on past property crimes (Mayo, 1983).

NDP or a similar model is needed now. Yet, there is little hope for implementation because of the widespread resistance by most police chiefs to making the major changes in organization, culture, and values necessary for true community policing/NDP. Although modern communication and technology may marginally enhance NDP, the model is completely workable with 1970's technology. It is basically a change in goals and values in public/municipal administration.

One step toward overcoming the barriers facing NDP is through the hiring and training of police. For the best police education, the President's Crime Commission recommended a BA degree in Social Sciences (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967).

Academy training frequently turns out an officer with values worse than those he or she had before entering the academy. The militaristic environment fosters hostile "us vs. them" attitudes that are incompatible with quality policing. Howard Earle, Under-Sheriff of Los Angeles County in the 1960's, conducted a comparison of military and collegiate models of basic training. He concluded that the collegiate model clearly produced better officers, but most police training was mired in the militaristic model (Earle, 1973).

In implementation of the author's model, resistance by officers is overcome by initially selecting volunteers who are informal leaders in the department. After a few months, they become disciples who would not consider returning to traditional policing. Even old burned-out and cynical officers came alive in this model.

The organization of the NDP model will work best if the community organization is based on existing community organizational boundaries that are demographically homogeneous. Following the beliefs of Levin and Meyers, NDP has the best chance where true COP exists. Yet, these places are few and far between.

A final note of caution: the ultimate authority, responsibility, and accountability for all policing in a city is legally with the chief and the city officials. This cannot be delegated. Careful monitoring and direction of NDP must be maintained to insure that it is in accordance with the laws and policies of the city, and the liability of the city is not endangered. The chief must not hesitate to have Internal Affairs investigate any suspicion of inappropriate actions anywhere in NDP. Also, the chief must be strong in insuring the integrity of the NPD community.
organization by ordering all officers not a part of that NDP area to never enter that territory except in fresh pursuit or at invitation of the NDP unit. NDP officers must have full control over all police activities in their area to be held accountable.

Endnotes

1 Dr. Mayo is the founder and Executive Director of the Police Association for College Education

2 The author is experienced in the design, development, and implementation of a model similar to Neighborhood Driven Policing. He directed a multi-year demonstration program in nine departments in the early 1970’s, and consulted on a more recent model in Laredo, Texas. In his model each officer was assigned as the personal police officer to about 300 homes or small businesses. Formal liaison was established between the officer and all municipal services as well as with relevant non-profit social service organizations. The liaison enabled the officer to quickly summon any kind of service needed to address a particular problem.

3 This assumes that an average patrol officer will answer four calls per shift in one eight hour period and will spend approximately 45 minutes on each call (3 hours total). An additional one hour of administrative time per shift demonstrates that four hours per shift (50%) is essentially wasted. Individual readers can decide whether these assumptions mirror reality in their agencies: The author’s experience indicates that these figures are typical for many agencies.

References


Network Centric Policing: Alternative or Augmentation to the Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP) Model?

Thomas J. Cowper

This article is a continuing dialog concerning potential evolutions of the current philosophical models of policing and addresses specific aspects of the NDP model proposed by Bernard H. Levin and Richard W. Myers. It should be understood that like their seminal work, this paper is intended to stimulate additional discussion regarding the various philosophies of policing and expand the existing range of choices available for adoption by police agencies in the future. The concept of Network Centric Policing (NCP) is intended as a theoretical guideline along a continuum more than a prescriptive mandate. It should also be noted that while I take issue with some aspects of the NDP model and offer an alternative perspective, I agree with the overall thrust and intent of the authors and commend them for their futuristic vision and foresight. Some, if not all of my differences with the NDP model as proposed are likely the result of my own misinterpretation of their excellent ideas and not due to errors or deficiencies with the NDP model itself. It is understood that this proposed NDP model is in the very early conceptual phase and many of its finer details remain to be developed. By nature of this discussion, many of the complexities and nuances of the various policing models, including NDP and NCP, will be ignored or generalized. Much additional analysis, discussion, and clarification will be required to sort through all the competing issues and achieve even a modicum of mutual understanding, if not consensus. It is likely, however, that the neighborhood-driven and network centric models could become dual components of the same policing philosophy of the future. Regardless, it is my hope that dialog on this subject will expand and improve our current policing options. We are certainly going to need them.

Introduction

Any philosophy of policing for the future that does not account for the dramatic changes to be wrought by technology in the next two decades will be fundamentally incomplete. This is true whether the philosophy is combat oriented or neighborhood-driven. The techniques of human decision-making, mechanisms of social interaction, as well as the processes and structures of organizations and communities, are changing unlike any other time in human history, and will continue to do so at an exponential rate (Kurzweil, 2001). Moreover, the tools by which we will conduct our lives and our businesses in just a few short years will offer us opportunities, benefits and dangers that are hard for many people to imagine today. The problems thus created will be potentially far more disruptive and socially, if not physically, destructive than those previously confronting society, and can be avoided only through the creation of real and timely solutions.

Twenty-first century technology will facilitate capabilities and requirements far beyond our own historical experience. Computer processing power will continue to increase exponentially (Kurzweil, 1999). Digital storage capacity and network transmission speeds, both wired and wireless, will continue to double every year (Lightman and Rojas, 2003). Micro and nanotechnologies are allowing for smaller and more human-centered form factors and will eventually enable computers and their power sources to be woven directly into the fabric of our
clothing (Mulhall, 2002). Augmented reality and augmented cognition will give one person in 2015 the same productivity as three or more people today (DARPA, 2003). Radio frequency identification and computer processing chips embedded within practically every manufactured item will allow us to interact with intelligent environments (homes, highways, office spaces, and public places) that are adaptable to and intuitive of our desires (Weiser, 1996). Intelligent agents and autonomous robots will free humans from today's mundane and trivial tasks that take very little creative intelligence but eat up inordinate amounts of time and detract from human productivity and leisure (Kotz and Gray, 1999). Cybernetic implants will enhance human performance and speed the exchange of information between the digital and biological world, creating a ubiquitous network of interconnected information nodes (Clark, 2003).

Twenty-first century police agencies must exploit these capabilities if they are to effectively serve their communities in the future, irrespective of the definition applied to "service" within a particular jurisdiction. The technology to gather, process, collate, analyze, and distribute information and intelligence in real-time to the right people at the right time in the right format will be available and increasingly more affordable. Businesses, non-police organizations, citizens, and our criminal/terrorist adversaries will take advantage of these capabilities. Police officers of the future must be able to compete in this future world. They will require the high degree of situational awareness provided by ubiquitous information and communication systems, advanced human-machine interfaces, and improved personal mobility. For law enforcement to be successful against the threats of the future and truly serve our communities, neighborhoods, and jurisdictions, we have to be flexible, adaptable, and reconfigurable, bringing together the appropriate resources and personnel to tackle whatever a rapidly changing situation warrants. The only way to accomplish this is through the proactive and intelligent use of emerging technologies.

**NDP: Industrial or Information Age?**

The Levin/Meyers NDP model addresses this aspect of our future and acknowledges many of these points. It focuses quite correctly on the growing incompatibility of our traditional industrial age policing models with the information age and acknowledges the movement toward human networks and away from bureaucratic hierarchies. It notes the speed of communication and the use of modern technologies to facilitate interactive information sharing. However, it is not clear to me how the "neighborhood leading itself and deciding its own fate" necessarily translates into an information age model. This issue of industrial vs. information paradigms in the 21st century is, I believe, much more significant than the NDP model seems to suggest and requires a much more significant and fundamental restructuring than merely shifting authority from police to the neighborhood. NDP seems on its face primarily a philosophy of governance and accountability, another step along an evolutionary path from combat policing, to community oriented policing, to NDP - a further shift in the locus of control. This shift is, I think, appropriate in some cases, perhaps ultimately. But theoretically, under the NDP model a police department could continue to operate in an industrial age mode as long as the "neighborhood" controlled the delivery of police services and was apparently content with them.
In that sense, the NDP model by itself may not fully achieve the kind of change necessary for success in the coming decades. Changing the locus of control over delivery of police services from the police to the neighborhood, while theoretically desirable and perhaps achievable in many communities, addresses a philosophical issue of governance and authority but does not by itself move policing from the industrial to the information age, nor solve the very significant problems associated with the delivery of police services within the context of the overall public safety arena in a fast-paced world. Without a corresponding and dramatic change in community/police organization, management, structure, operational methodology, and technology, NDP might easily slow police decision-making, bogging it down in the hierarchical processes of its combat and community oriented predecessors through the centralized morass of an inefficient neighborhood board.

That neighborhood board, in most cases composed of unpaid community volunteers, may be very traditional in its governing processes andcould easily be slower and more cumbersome than a traditional police bureaucracy in responding to community problems. Moreover, untrained community members may not have the skills or the desire necessary to drive improvements in the decision-making process. They may not be equipped mentally, psychologically, or culturally to cope with the radical technological changes required to move away from the industrial age paradigm they grew up with and might stifle police desires to improve and modernize. It may lock a neighborhood into an industrial age police methodology and allow isolation in operation, information sharing and interagency cooperation or interoperability. This may suit the board and may satisfy the desires of a particular local population but it does not address the fundamental aspects of the information age that are dramatically impacting the broader public safety arena as well as the majority of police agencies in regards to crime, terrorism, and community (or neighborhood) peace, prosperity, and security.

I do not believe the neighborhood is the "only effective level" of homeland security as the authors suggest. Crimes, terrorist attacks, disasters, and public safety events are not exclusively or even predominantly local in nature. Rather, homeland security, crimes, disasters, traffic safety, order maintenance, and other public safety concerns, in the information age rapidly becoming the wireless information age, (Lightman and Rojas, 2003) are in fact most often multi-jurisdictional in nature. Criminals are more mobile today and their crimes, criminal enterprises, and the problems they create for society impact large regions while being multi-faceted and complex to solve. Further, these issues are best dealt with when coordinated "globally" with a strategic or unified orientation, not piecemeal and haphazardly by isolated departments with a parochial local predisposition. Effective homeland security, as well as the provision of public safety services, now and in the future, requires close and continuous coordination and cooperation across the spectrum of social resources and organizations, both geographically and electronically. To be effective this coordination and cooperation must occur at all levels of government (federal, state, and local), among all governmental sectors (police, fire, EMS, transportation, social services, military), between the public and private sectors (corporate security, business, not for profit), and between public servants and public citizens, within the neighborhood and otherwise.

This does not mean to imply the need for centralized control, highly structured processes and policies, or the imposition of rigid standards of operation. On the contrary, the information
age increasingly negates attempts to control, structure, and standardize. Fluid, dynamic, and seemingly chaotic processes will undoubtedly solve many of tomorrow's complex problems, but it is the unified, universal, and real-time sharing of useful information between all interested parties, groups and individuals that will be at the core of those processes. Access to all manner of information will be a requirement of this chaotic information age world that is increasingly interconnected and interdependent.

While none of this negates the validity, or even the desirability of the NDP model in many circumstances, there is, I believe, more to moving the policing world into the 21st century than simply shifting some departments, if their citizens so choose, to neighborhood control. We are in fact moving towards a network oriented social order - an interconnected web of individuals. Communication, information access, knowledge acquisition, and the individual productivity that results from them are the hallmarks of our collective future and derive from the growing connected array of individuals and their shared sources of information. This "network centric" society based upon the real-time and ubiquitous sharing of information is at the heart of today's technological advancement, driving radical social, political, economic, and cultural change in our world. It is the result of an increasing availability of useful, appropriate, and timely data, specifically tailored to an individual’s environment, problems, and relationships. This immediate access to the right data in real time is changing people, organizations, and human interaction. Success in this new world (individual, organizational, and social) is dependent upon our continued ability to adapt, live within, and effectively apply net-centric principles and the technologies that support them (Alberts, et al, 1999).

**The Theory**

Network Centric Policing moves police organization and operation from the industrial age construct of centralized bureaucratic control, rigid hierarchical structures, systematic managerial processes, with formalized and authorized official policies and agreements, to a less structured, non-centralized, real-time association of interconnected individuals acting with regard to common goals. It is a philosophy that is fully compatible with, and capitalizes upon the tools and dynamics of the information age. The old models concern themselves with procedure, policy, order, and control. Their philosophy is one of process, command, and strict accountability. The NCP philosophy sets aside those concerns and concentrates on the product, on achieving success, on increasing individual productivity, on maximizing the distribution of information to solve real problems. The goal is achieving effective and appropriate solutions quickly in a rapidly changing environment. NCP requires a completely new culture of control, a new structure, new operational methodologies, and the emerging technological tools to facilitate them. It is a philosophy that embraces information age technology to maximize human productivity and effectively and efficiently solve human problems.

This network centric business or operational paradigm has been under development within the corporate world and the military for many years. In theory, net-centric operations are those where highly networked personnel draw on information from the widest variety of sources, including fixed and mobile sensors, and on-line databases, in real-time, and maximize the sharing of the accumulated information throughout the entire network continuously. This is much more than simply sharing information with fellow workers. The purpose of the NCP model is to
analyze and share information in a way that improves the overall quality of the information and thereby increases a shared situational and organizational awareness for everyone on the network. Improved overall awareness enables more effective and appropriate collaboration through the creation of mutual mental models (MMMs) which foster self-synchronization throughout the entire organization--the process whereby highly informed groups organize and direct their collective yet distributed activities from the bottom up, without centralized command or control but operating within a framework of organizational intent. This in turn creates a much more effective and efficient organization, accelerating and coordinating the accomplishment of all tasks to rapidly achieve organizational goals (Hutchins, et al, 2001).

The Concept

A net-centric police agency would be intricately connected, internally and externally. The "network" in this case is not just IT hardware but would consist of people (all agency personnel and local citizens), computers, databases, all manner of digital information derived from intelligence sources and sensors (e.g., neighborhood watch groups, private security guards, security and surveillance cameras, autonomous robots and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)), information from other agencies/organizations (local, state and federal government, along with information from citizens, the neighborhood, the larger community, and an entire region). It would use this network to generate, collate, analyze, and distribute information to everyone who needs it, in real time, in the manner required to best utilize it to achieve positive policing results. The purpose of this information network is not simply to provide individual officers appropriate information at a specific time and place, though that is certainly desirable. The main purpose of the network is to provide everyone a comprehensive picture of:

- The organization its mission, goals, current priorities, ongoing activities, unit deployments, organizational intent, and
- His or her immediate and local context.

These two continuously changing pictures combine to form a unique and detailed shared organizational awareness and enhanced situational awareness for every individual member of the agency. From this awareness flow the MMMs that allow all members to quickly make decisions and act in ways that are:

- Coordinated,
- Consistent,
- Effective,
- Mutually supporting, and
- Self-synchronizing.

In other words, with the right information, provided at the right time, within a commonly understood context, in a way that is useful and appropriate to every individual, there is no need for orders to be passed up and down a chain of command, no need for detailed and specific managerial directions and supervisory oversight for every situation, and no need for all of the bureaucratic industrial age processes that slow traditional police operations to a crawl and force agencies into a reactive instead of a proactive posture. Every member understands what he/she needs to accomplish, why he/she needs to accomplish it, the current parameters of organizational (commander's, community's or neighborhood's) intent, and the information necessary to do so quickly and effectively.
The concept of organizational intent is the unifying or controlling component of the NCP model. It forms the contextual basis for all actions within the organization. It consists not of direction, orders, or specific commands but of guidance: a generalized framework from which MMMs and self-synchronization can flow. In fact, there are organizational aspects of command, responsibility, and accountability that will be with us long into the future no matter how quickly we transition to the information age, but these aspects can all be retained within the NCP model. A fully networked organization, where everyone knows where everyone else is, what they are doing, and why they are doing it is inherently conducive to accountability.

This concept could also facilitate adoption of the NCP model itself to either of the combat or community oriented policing philosophies (though not without significant cultural and organizational modification), and most readily to the proposed NDP philosophy of Levin and Meyers. By applying respectively the commander's, the community's, or the neighborhood's intent within a net-centric model, each of these philosophies, generally speaking, could be accommodated. Table 1 compares the net-centric model with the combat, community and neighborhood-driven models. In any case, most departments require a transitional phase from one philosophy to another. By adopting the less bureaucratic, less authoritarian organizational intent concept, agencies might be able to slowly transition from hierarchical structures and reactive methodologies simply by continuously upgrading technology and learning to self-synchronize over time. It must be remembered however, that the more structure, hierarchy, and centralized direction an organization retains, the less effective the model will be in relation to others farther along the transitional path. But with a basic understanding of net-centric principles and a desire to improve over time, any agency could transition its current policing philosophy into an information age net-centric model.

This conceptual model is quite obviously incomplete and will require the detailed consideration of a host of additional factors in order to be successful, such as:

- Resource acquisition and allocation,
- Recruiting, hiring, and training,
- Specialization vs. generalization,
- Sworn members vs. civilian employees,
- Agency and community/neighborhood interaction,
- Technology,
- Logistic support, and
- Administration.

Conclusion

Emerging and powerful technologies are driving change, both in the overall social and cultural context, and in our personal everyday lives. To be competitive and successful in a digital world requires an ability to confidently adapt to this changing landscape, creatively incorporating new tools and concepts into our lives while continuously evolving our business models and organizational processes to take advantage of them.

NCP could be this next evolutionary step for the operation of police agencies in the 21st century. Many of society's businesses and militaries, as well as its criminal and terrorist adversaries, are switching or have already adapted to a similar decentralized and self-synchronizing model of operation. If the policing profession cannot make a similar paradigm shift we may find ourselves being of little practical service to our communities and neighborhoods in the future. This shift cannot be accomplished by traditional
police agencies overnight. The leap would be too
great. Therefore, we must begin the slow
evolutionary shift immediately. The technological
tools to facilitate the NCP model are emerging
today. Centralized combat and community based
approaches could be transitioned to the non-
centralized, self-synchronized NCP model while
retaining their combat-oriented or community-
oriented philosophies in the short-term. The NDP
model would appear to be an even better fit.

Endnotes

1 Thomas Cowper is a Staff Inspector with the NY State Police and
the Associate Director in charge of Engineering and Technology
for the Statewide Wireless Network within NY State’s Office for
Technology.

References


DARPA, (2003). Information Processing Technology Office, Augmented Cognition Program, Program Objectives FY02-FY06. At URL


accessed 08/04/2003.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Combat Oriented</th>
<th>Community Oriented</th>
<th>Neighborhood Driven</th>
<th>Net-Centric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control</strong></td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>De-Centralized, Community Input</td>
<td>Neighborhood, Police Input</td>
<td>Organizational Intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander, or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Community, or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>Flatter Hierarchy</td>
<td>Neighborhood Determined</td>
<td>Human Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method of Operation</strong></td>
<td>Reactive Response</td>
<td>Problem Oriented</td>
<td>Neighborhood Determined</td>
<td>Self-Synchronization Mutual Mental Models</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Response to: A proposal for an Enlarged Range of Policing: Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP)

Gene Stephens

The concept of NDP as outlined by Levin and Myers provides a natural progression from community-oriented (COP) and problem-oriented policing (POP). In fact, looking at the theory and recommended practice of COP and POP, NDP appears to be what was envisioned (Trojanowicz & Carter, 1988; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990; Normandeaux & Leighton, 1990; Pepinsky & Quinn 1991; BJA, 1993; Miller & Hess, 1994; and NIJ, 1996 a&b).

One of the more comprehensive definitions of community policing came from Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990): “Community policing is a new philosophy of policing, based on the concept that police officers and private citizens working together in creative ways can help solve contemporary community problems related to crime, fear of crime, social land physical disorder, and neighborhood decay. The philosophy is predicated on the belief that achieving these goals requires that police departments develop a new relationship with the law-abiding people in the community, allowing them a greater voice in setting local police priorities and involving them in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods. Its shifts the focus of police work from handling random calls to solving community problems” (p. 5).

Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux added COP required community-building, trust, and cooperation. This definition could be interpreted to mean the police must seek out community leadership and turn over responsibility for needs analysis and policy direction to the community, with police becoming partners to "protect and serve" the neighborhoods. In reality, many police departments, either from lack of knowledge or understanding--or simply a different interpretation--of the concept, have either sought community assistance in meeting their missions and goals (such as establishing neighborhood watch) or created community organizations to advise the department on needs and direction, while retaining full decision-making authority within the agency.

In a published debate on war models versus peace models of policing (Stephens & Doerner, 1999), this author argued for peace models, holding that: "COP is a proactive crime prevention strategy--a way of achieving community peace--under which police work with the community and social service agencies to ferret out crime-breeding problems and work together to alleviate them before crime results. Ultimately under this system, having to catch criminals is a sign of failure, and stopping crimes from occurring is a signal of success” (p. 197).

In a rejoinder to this, Dr. William G. Doerner of Florida State University and the Tallahassee Police Department said such an approach to policing had a "dark lining" of "social engineering" which is unacceptable in a democratic society (Stephens & Doerner, 1999, pp. 203-204). Earlier Doerner held: "Policing is a luxury. Law enforcement is a necessity" (p. 190), adding: "The police belong in the crime suppression business. They already have too many unfinished law enforcement tasks awaiting their attention without saddling them with the extra burden of a social agenda” (p.193).

Thus, it is easy to see how many police agencies have refused to give up any power to the community and have either ignored or subverted the concept of COP and POP. It would be difficult to see how NDP would fare better in the short term.

That said, NDP still seems to be the way
to go—the only approach that promises the benefits to the community envisioned by peace model thinkers; the only approach that has a chance of accomplishing the goals of preventing crime and fear of crime.


The last of these commissions referred to the 1,000+ years of the Mutual Pledge System in England, where it was each citizen’s responsibility to "raise the hue and cry" if he/she had knowledge of a crime and to serve on a posse to bring any suspected offender before the king's court. Failure to accomplish these duties could result in monetary fines. This system prevailed in the American colonies and the early days of the new nation, as public policing (paid by tax dollars) did not appear until the second quarter of the 19th century. Thus, NDP is in keeping with the nation's policing tradition.

Placing NDP within a Broader Context

The call for community/neighborhood level control of the justice system has gone beyond policing as evidenced by the burgeoning restorative and balanced justice system movement in the United States and beyond (Braithewaite, 1994; Zehr, 1995; Galway and Husdon, 1996; Bazemore, 1997; Nicoll, 1997; Umbreit, 1997). Citizen control and participation in justice can clearly be seen in the Common Law/Justice of the Peace heritage begun in England and carried to the Colonies, under which citizen JPs sat in judgment on fellow citizens using only the unwritten mores and customs of the community as a guide in an equity proceeding (National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973). Codified law and professional judges replaced all but the lowest level courts in the U.S. in the 19th and 20th centuries and corrections moved from goals (jails) where defendants and convicted offenders were held only until their punishment (e.g., flogging, dunking, hanging, payment of fines) could be meted out to prisons and other units where professional "corrections" officials carried out the sentences--often months and years of incarceration.

Frustration with the delays, failure to separate guilty from innocent, inability to control further criminal behavior or rehabilitate offenders, and inability to balance the rights of society with those of the accused led to a public perception that too many guilty go free and too many innocent suffer needlessly, resulting in a loss of respect for the system (Ibid.).

The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADP) division of the American Bar Association (ABA) has as its goal to keep many disputes--especially those involving people who know one another or who regularly interact--out of the traditional criminal (and to some extent civil) court system (see American Bar Association, undated). In many ways this was a late response to a movement well underway--the Restorative and Balanced Justice System.

In formulating the restorative justice paradigm, McCold and Wachtel (2003) noted that restorative justice is a meant to repair harm. The process involves transforming conflict into cooperation, repairing emotional and relational as well as material harm. To achieve this, victims, offenders, and their communities must interact. Basic to the concept are responsibility of the offender for reparations to individual victims and
to the community followed (or simultaneous) with community care for the offender (e.g., social services, counseling, job training) and eventual reconciliation of all parties.

Restorative justice only works where the community is both in control and involved in the daily operations. Like COP and NDP (when it arrives), restorative justice is designed to be proactive in the sense it seeks a just determination of fault followed by a just repayment for harm and a just concern and attention to the needs of the offender to enable him/her to live in the community as a productive law-abiding citizen, thus preventing further crime.

It should come as no surprise that some, including this author (Stephens, 1989, 2001), have called for merging the community-oriented policing concepts with restorative justice into a unified system. One of the most compelling cases has been made by Caroline G. Nicholl (1999, 2000) in her studies published by the U.S. Dept. of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. After several experiments with community justice while commander of the Milton Keynes, England, police agency, Nicholl came to the U.S. on a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Fellowship and stayed as director of community policing in the District of Columbia. The title of her 1999 book illuminates the approach she envisions: *Community Policing, Community Justice, and Restorative Justice: Exploring the Links for the Delivery of a Balanced Approach to Public Safety.*

Her 2000 volume goes further: *Toolbox for Implementing Restorative Justice and Advancing Community Policing.*

In her "Final Comments," Nicholl (1999) summarizes her viewpoint: “The central proposition of this report is that democracy will suffer if policing and justice continue to treat the problem of crime as one requiring more, rather than less, use of a professionally run criminal justice system. The recognized need to invigorate communities and citizens to promote informal social controls will continue to be undermined by the focus on enforcement through legal due process—unless there is a real commitment to social justice” (p. 171).

Nicoll (1999) concluded "police should be exercising the potentially powerful option—an option that represents a natural progression of developments to date—to begin the application of restorative justice" (p.174).

**Some Key Questions for NDP**

NDP will have to include in its implementation strategy answers/approaches to solving many of the same dilemmas faced earlier by COP and POP programs: What is a neighborhood? How do we identify a neighborhood? Where does one neighborhood end and another begin? Can we create a neighborhood? How do we cope with prejudices and powerful interests in neighborhoods? Can citizen control of crime policy be maintained within the parameters of law and the U.S. Constitution?

Using legal subdividing (e.g., towns and unincorporated but named units in a larger incorporated city) has not provided the answer to the "what is neighborhood" question in many cases. If neighborhood is defined as an "interactive group," there are many areas which in fact are not within a neighborhood (e.g., transients, recluses, homebound) and others where citizens would appear to have a common interest but do not interact. Thus, simply determining whether a neighborhood exists, and if so, where it begins and ends, requires considerable effort. Many cities, such as Los Angeles, are an amalgamation of many subunits (e.g., Anaheim, Hollywood,
Santa Monica), each with even smaller communities and neighborhoods (what is the difference?), some well defined, some not. Some named subunits do not include a community or neighborhood of interacting citizens. The anonymity in many communities plus the distrust of "the other" thwart the mission of NDP.

Can neighborhoods be created where none exist? Probably only if citizens can be persuaded they have common interests--at least in providing a safe area--and those interests are worth the effort of organizing and interacting, a time-consuming process. Here in the South, we would say it would have to start with a "pig picking"--an all-night slow barbecuing of a pig on a roast at the end of a cul-de-sac that attracts residents to come out of their homes to see what is going on and staying to chat and "meet the neighbors." Perhaps another method would be to initiate a neighborhood watch program as a beginning step. Either way, police would have to be the neighborhood organizers at the beginning, using skills that are often new to officers dedicated to fighting crime.

Once a neighborhood is defined or created, developing an organization and leadership to sustain an ongoing needs analysis, policy development and program implementation cycle will prove difficult and, again, alien to most experience from traditional policing. To be successful, the oversight organization must be representative of the community and dedicated to the difficult and time-consuming task. Often the only persons who will commit to such an endeavor are those who hope to gain advantage for themselves or for the interests of their particular group (e.g., ethnic, income, occupation) in the community.

When interest groups dominate the oversight organization, the problem of keeping policing in line with the law and the U.S. Constitution often occurs. Some citizens are often more than willing to violate others' rights in order to gain advantage or satisfy their wishes. Ordinance enforcement (e.g., vagrancy, loitering, public nuisance, curfews, building codes) is readily available to support such desires.

Too long to discuss here is the issue of whether current police agencies/officers can be persuaded to give up power to the citizenry and follow citizen mandates for services (when citizen/police disagreements occur).

These are only a few of the myriad of issues to be overcome to implement true NDP.

Conclusion

Neighborhood-Driven Policing is an excellent addition to the community policing approach, but NDP should be placed in the broader conceptualization of the balanced and restorative justice system. Only when enforcement, adjudication, and corrections are included together in a community justice paradigm can we hope for real change in the way we deal with crime and justice. Considering NDP as part of the restorative movement will also provide a plethora of new proponents and new support for the massive and difficult changes to come.

Endnotes

1Gene Stephens is Professor Emeritus at the University of South Carolina.

References


It was between the years 600 to 1400 in England that Anglo-Saxon laws were written down. Laws were considered "weapons" of the state and served as the legitimate remedy for wrongdoing for the victim and his/her kin. In this way, formal justice supplanted the previous system of private revenge or blood feud. Laws laid down the requirement that local communities must pursue criminals and offenders and deliver them to the royal courts: harboring criminals became a serious offence punishable by death. This is the first true example of "community policing." After the successful invasion of England in 1066, the King began to raise revenues from administering the criminal justice system by the imposition of fines and compensation. The mission of the crown became to promote the spiritual welfare of the people by leveraging force against wrong-doers (an early form of "serve and protect.")

In the twelfth century, greater emphasis was placed on the role of the community and its accountability to the king through the system of "frankpledge," the local "watch," the "hue and cry," and the judgment of outlawry. Frankpledge, an oath of loyalty to the King, was the obligation of all citizens to pursue offenders and ensure the good behaviour of other members of the community. Subsequently, Sheriffs were appointed in counties as the first law officers to coordinate criminal cases and arrest suspects; they could also call out the "posse comitatus," which consisted of all adult males. The powers of Sheriffs were then superseded by the appointment of other law officers such as Coroners and Serjeants (sic) of the Peace.

Laws of in the 13th century obliged every town, borough, and city to set up a watch each night during the summer to arrest strangers and pursue those who sought to flee. "Constables of Castle" were appointed by the Crown, but "Constables" in towns were elected annually by the community they served. Constables had a range of military, policing, and revenue functions: these were the first true police patrols. Other legal entities within towns and cities were the Bailiffs and Beadles who had duties to exact fines, execute warrants, and deal with orphaned or foundling children.

As a result of the social, health, and political problems of the 13th and 14th centuries, communal policing began to be replaced by a substantial body of appointed legal officers. In the mid 14th century, the Justice of the Peace (JP) role was created to deal with civil and criminal disputes and offences; from this time until 1600, the roles of Constable and JP evolved into the role they perform today. From 1600 onward, many criminal law statutes were passed by the legislature, but it was not until the 1750s that the police first had real investigatory and crime prevention functions.

At that time in London, Henry Fielding started the Bow Street runners, who gained a reputation as expert thief takers. In 1822, Robert Peel was appointed Home Secretary and the celebrated "general instructions" were written for the Metropolitan Police Service.
SIR ROBERT PEEL’S NINE PRINCIPLES

- The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder.

- The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.

- Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public.

- The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force.

- Police seek and preserve public favor not by catering to public opinion but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law.

- Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient.

- Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.

- Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary.

- The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it.

Source: New Westminster Police (undated)
Borough and rural police forces formed in the 19th century. Policing from that time went on unchanged until the 1960's when changes in society required a fundamental re-think in operational policing. A Royal Commission issued a report in 1960 that resulted in the Police Act of 1964. Transportation, organization, command, and control of the police service was changed forever and the fond image of the "bobby on the beat" was erased from reality.

Policing became more scientific and managed, leading (via the temporarily popular "managing objectives") to the increased focus on outputs and outcomes that we experience today in policing and other public service organizations in the UK.

1980s Politicized Police?

Indeed, during the 1980s and onward to the present day, the police in the UK have become increasingly politicized. We can identify this through the approach taken to dealing with major incidents of public disorder (for example miners strikes through 1980s) and attempts to articulate police professional standards and ethical principles such as the Metropolitan Police Principles and the Association of Chief Police Officers' Statement of Common Purpose and Values of 1985 and 1990 respectively. This led to a new focus and need for examination of policing principles and ethics. Several books were published to open up debate on the subject, which went along the lines of questioning why ethics are important, and identifying the ideal ethical police service.

1990s Cause Celebres

In the UK during the 1990s, there were several high profile examples of police incompetence or mismanagement (see Neyroud & Beckley, 2001) and corruption.

As well, in Europe, several models of policing have emerged over the last two centuries. Most are described as democratic policing systems, but they move from the extreme of locally appointed, locally accountable systems such as those recently introduced in Belgium, through to the locally appointed but centrally accountable in the UK to the quasi-military, centralized system in France and other European States.

There is a correlation between the cohesion of society and the model of policing that is appropriate for that society. To achieve greater accessibility to the police and interaction with the community, it is necessary for citizens to participate in its policing.

The "best practice" model to establish a system of democratic policing in any country is thought to be the "tripartite" system whereby accountability is separated by having the three pillars of governance: legislature, executive and judiciary. This formula has been found to establish the necessary checks and balances in civil society to ensure that crime is punished but also the rights of individuals are respected.

Our short history of policing is brought up to the year 2003 by the introduction of rights-based law in the shape of the Human Rights Act of 1998 and other developments (see Beckley, 2000) such as the new Oath of Office for police officers that incorporated a statement on human rights.
Conclusion

As proposed by Levin & Myers, NDP appears to propel us "back to the future." In essence, it represents a sort of 21st century Frankpledge with citizens responsible for the safety of their community. It is a notion that bears consideration, as long as one recalls the evolution of the policing profession in the UK. To that end, a vigorous emphasis on civil rights and ethical behavior must underscore the activities of both community members and the police in the NDP model (or any other model, for that matter). If that happens, Peel's vision may finally be realized.

Endnotes

1 Alan Beckley is a (retired) Chief Inspector of the West Mercia Constabulary in the United Kingdom.

References


Going Local:
A History of the Future of the Police
Lucy Harrad

Introduction

Scenario planning is a useful tool to understand the complex effects of a policy in the long-term future. However the situation in the future is likely to be affected by unpredictable events beyond the control or foresight of the author. The following is intended merely as an interesting exploration of an idea, using a narrative structure, to provoke further thought and debate on the issues involved.

This scenario is a response to some of the issues raised in the Policy Exchange paper Going Local: Who Should Run Britain's Police? (see Loveday and Reid, 2004).

Scenario

The following is an extract from Prof. Barry Cole (2067) The Downfall of the Police Service. London: Blacklee Publishing, Ltd.

It is possible to track the present situation from its beginnings in the first half of the 21st century. By 2050, all the PCs (Police Co-workers) were organized into small policing units, called Policing Teams (PTs) of around 10 to 20 PCs. These were each headed by a PTL, or Police Team Leader. The PTL had to organize the varying workloads, allocate resources, and try to manage policing on the streets. This was often a highly stressful task and so many PTLs had resigned from stress-related illnesses that it had become difficult to recruit. At a regional force level, the PTLs and policing teams were supported -- or possibly overlain -- by a layer of management, computer, communications, forensic, scientific, and administrative staff who received information from the public via a wide range of media. This staff also tracked crime patterns, analyzed evidence, advised PTLs, and administered crime recording and the police arm of the central citizen database. The whole force was led by the Chief Executive of Police (the old post of Chief Constable) who reported directly to a board made up of local council members.

Now that the police were directly answerable to and funded by the local council, the question of local politics had become a burning one for all police forces. The local council formed a sort of executive board for policing issues in their areas, and had the power to hire and fire the Chief Executive of Police at will, depending upon his/her co-operation with their policies and the performance of the force. They were able to allocate money to specific crime areas that the council wanted dealt with as a high priority -- which in practice often became a highly politicized process. The system was intended to be properly democratic, placing the police in the hands of people (or the elected representatives) and making the head of police answerable to the councilors for results. It was argued that whatever the will of the people was, it could not be wrong if it was what the majority wanted. This was, after all, the very essence of democracy. Certainly, the police forces had been unable to argue against it, being condemned in the press as fascist, authoritative, and power-crazed for their opposition. Large police forces had been split into county-sized forces, each police area made coterminous with the local authority boundaries, and the chief executives of the police forces put on short term contracts, hired directly by council leaders.
Local councils had been delighted with the changes, having argued for many years that there was nothing wrong with policing that giving the councils more power over it wouldn’t solve. On their side were many years of survey results showing the public fear of crime rising year-on-year, despite the falling crime rate (which had fallen overall since as far back as the 1970s). This, they suggested, showed that the police service had withdrawn from communities and the things that mattered to them. Constabulary independence was seen as insulating the police from local community pressures, and making the police forces unaccountable. In addition, it had been necessary to fund the police from local taxation rather than central government money, so the public had had to be given more direct control over the service.

However, many people had long since lost faith in their own local councils and were disenchanted with the democratic process; they did not see real differences between many of the candidates and did not want to vote for a whole raft of policies from a particular political spectrum. It turned out that the recorded rise in peoples’ fear of crime was linked instead to much wider social changes, fed by an ever-more hysterical media. The police reforms actually had the effect of increasing peoples’ fear of crime more, as they felt less and less protected by a police force clearly in crisis and reacting to every whim of their local council.

As a result, the turnout for local government elections had fallen gradually over the past fifty years, from 25% to less than 9%. It was now possible to become a councillor in charge of police priorities with the support of only 5% of the electorate and no knowledge or experience of the police at all. At the same time, the central Westminster government had devolved much of its power to the local authorities, giving them responsibility for setting budgets and taxes, running all the hospitals, schools, fire services, and police services in their area. Often untrained in management and uncertain of the issues involved, and unable to devote themselves to managing each service full-time, councillors often struggled to maintain even the standards inherited from the previous system.

The various attempts by the local councils to control policing relied heavily on the statistics produced by the police themselves: a contradiction that many felt gave the police leeway to subvert council decisions. Councils who tried to tighten the reins started to monitor the figures closely, delighted with every tiny fall in crime (which was immediately widely advertised in the press) and furious with every small rise in crime (which the press reported anyway). Their over-reaction to tiny shifts in the crime rates, particularly for crimes which already had low figures (where a small increase expressed as a percentage increase looked like a disastrous trend), resulted in council directives lurching from extreme to extreme, trying to shore up any perceived failing in what was really natural variation in a complex social system such as crime. The public, confused by the wildly varying figures and statistics, grew disenchanted with their police and standards of performance and started to seek an electoral candidate who could really take the public services in hand.

In several areas, the local councils had become vehicles for particular groups who were able to mobilize enough opinion to vote, and who, once in office, were able to wield considerable power. This was often the only way to achieve a clear majority, because communities had less clear identity and were less cohesive than ever before, and so frequently votes were split between many different candidates.

In some force areas, councilors represented extremist right-wing parties, or were elected on the strength of single-issue policies such as getting
the litter cleaned up from the streets, improving
the performance of the local schools, or getting
more ambulances out onto the streets within ten
minutes of a call.

Sometimes the councilors had no interest
in the police at all: others had very strong views
about what the police should do. Either type was
regarded with deep suspicion by the police and
often resulted in worse policing. Policing had
become extremely varied across the country,
depending upon the type and diversity of the
community, the political color of the council, levels
of funding, and the rural-urban mix of the area.
The worse the policing record, the more likely
that a candidate would be elected on promises to
improve police performance. At that point, the
chief executive would promptly get sacked and
the force would be thrown into chaos with the
imposition of harsh new rules. Morale in the police
was low and the difficulties of being a police
leader, especially a chief executive, were such
that hardly anyone could be recruited to the role.
Chief executives were made personally responsible
for the performance of their force and were often
used as scapegoats by councilors anxious to explain
away poor results at election time. Invariably, this
undermined the PCs confidence, and many would
leave or reduce their hours. The council would
turn to other public interest topics, and so the
whole cycle - or spiral - would turn again.

A step-change in the system of democratic
control of the police was the election of Councilor
Robin Hayes to the local council authority in 2048.
This was a new twist in the spiral, or "balance of
democratic policing" as it was called by the
government. Robin Hayes was elected on an
unusual and innovative political agenda. Realizing
that perhaps 10% of the potential electorate were
themselves criminals, the councilor had promised
to protect them against the police. This, of course,
handicapped the police from catching or
prosecuting criminals. Hayes was elected by an
overwhelming majority of the vote despite the
electoral turn-out reaching a ten-year high of 18%,
with people both in favor and opposed to the
scheme mobilized to vote. Fourteen percent had
been in favor of reducing police "interference."
The coalition that supported this emerged,
surprisingly, not only from the criminal fraternity
but also from many who felt the police were
useless, targeted the wrong people, or - infringed
upon individual choices. "Targeting the wrong
people" included motorists who felt they should
be allowed to drive how they liked without penalty,
people opposed to immigrants being allowed to
settle in their area, people who felt the police did
not do enough to catch and punish pedophiles and
sex offenders (a rising area of crime which had
been given a high profile in the press), and those
who simply objected to a police force enforcing
laws against them.

As a direct result, there were huge changes
to the role given the police service. The police
beats were generally restricted to low-crime middle
class areas where people felt reassured to see
them. The chances of catching any criminals there
were small, and levels of arrests and convictions
had naturally fallen sharply. In the high crime
areas, a kind of crime "mafia" had arisen, running
its own illegal and vigilante-based policing system.
This, in fact, succeeded in bringing down the rate
of reported crime dramatically. The fall in crime
had been seized upon by the council as prima
facie evidence of success, and was a major selling-
point in the run-up to the next elections.

The argument went that peoples' natural
moral sense would provide sufficient in policing
and controlling bad behavior. Moreover, it would
operate more effectively and efficiently than the
police force ever could. Others argued that the
already large proportion of unreported crime had
simply grown larger because people preferred to
deal with crimes themselves in their own community, according to cultural customs, rather than through laws of the country. In other words, criminal activity has simply become lost in the anarchy.

The loss of many facets of the role of police workers through the restrictions placed upon them had, oddly enough, chimed well with the changes already underway in the police service. It had become ever more difficult to impose a strict interpretation of justice and the law on an increasingly diverse and individualistic population. People had lost trust in institutions generally and no longer believed that professionals should have any authority over them. Uniformed police officers telling the public what to do and what not to do were an anachronism, widely perceived as disrespectful for one’s rights and one’s own personal opinions. People preferred to judge according to their own opinions and moral standard rather than the law.

In recent years, the theory of policing had become confused and almost logically unsustainable. As a result, many people recognized that, as an institution, the old-fashioned police service was unsuitable for the modern world. In addition, the old-style police officer was gone: after the reforms giving power to elected local councilors, police officers had become increasingly cynical and disillusioned with their jobs and what they were being asked to do. They were annoyed with the frequent changes in policy and changes in local councilors, and felt they were no longer able to do their jobs. Many people left, nearly halving the size of the police service in only five years. As the police were therefore less able to do the job asked of them and control the rising tide of anti-social behaviors, people felt the police were useless and unreliable. They grew to prefer the anti-police agenda of their local council. After all, wasn’t vigilantism or community control working much better?

The downfall of the police service between 2050 and the present day has been hailed by many as the natural disintegration of an outdated and institutionally old-fashioned organization. Others bemoan the "golden age" of late 20th and early 21st century policing, where it could be argued that democracy, peace, and tolerance were at their zenith. It is undeniable that since this period, crime (especially violent crime, gun-crime, and hi-tech crime) has risen dramatically. But in this modern information-based age of diffuse organizations, diverse workforces, and a large disaffected youth and ethnic population, it was impossible that a police service would be able to cope. Modern solutions, such as electronic tagging, the national DNA database, all-scientific cyber-analysis of crime-scenes, and technological crime prevention wherever possible, seem more likely to resolve the current crime problems. Self-policing communities, able to administer their own forms of justice in accordance with their own culture and belief systems, became the norm rather than the exception.

Endnotes

1 Dr. Lucy Harrad is the Environmental Impact Planner, Corporate Development, Thames Valley Police Headquarters, Kidlington, Oxon. OX5 2NX United Kingdom. Email: Lucy.Harrad@thamesvalley.pnn.police.uk

References
